Conflict of principle and pragmatism: locus standi under article 173(4) ECT ; Vortrag gehalten am 26. November 1996 by Cooke, John D.
Conflict of Principle and Pragmatism 




It may appear surprising that, given a free choice of topic for this lecture, I should 
choose a subject which is as frequently written about as that of locus standi of private 
parties under Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome. I have to confess that this is partly due 
to a process of re-education - of myself. Before my appointment to the Court of First 
Instance earlier this year I had practised at the bar for almost thirty years and although 
a good deal of my practice was in the area of Community law, I contrived to avoid the 
complexities of Article 173 for most of that time. This is probably not as unusual as you 
might think. For most lawyers practising the broad range of commercial law at national 
level, their main encounters with Community law arise where Community law is of direct 
effect. The questions arise in the course of the usual run of cases which involve the 
construction of Community provisions so that questions of Community law get 
ventilated through the medium of Article 177. Apart from that, the average practitioner 
comes into contact with decisions in the area of competition law, state aids and so forth 
where he is acting for a client to whom the decision is addressed. As a result, it is only 
in rare cases that an issue of locus standi for the purposes of taking a direct annulment 
action against a Community measure before the European Court arises. In the light of 
what I am going to say to you this evening, that is, I think, an important practical 
consideration to be borne in mind when considering the problem of locus standi in the 
overall context of Community law. As I have tried to re-educate myself on this subject, 
one thing that has surprised me is the degree to which Community jurisprudence over a 
fairly short period reflects the development which has taken place over a far longer 
period in many national legal systems, especially in the common law countries. The 
debates have been similar. The progress has been one from a restrictive approach 
which protects the primacy of  legislation and the efficiency of administration, towards a 
flexible and pragmatic one which seeks to give greater emphasis to protecting the rights 
of the individual without jeopardizing legal certainty. The fundamental issue in the 
debate is how a democratic society based upon the rule of law can best strike the 
balance between two potentially opposing interests, namely that of safeguarding the 
protection of the rights of the individual citizen against the oppressive exercise of 
administrative power, on the one hand, and securing, on the other, the efficient and 
effective exercise of executive authority on behalf of elected representatives. 
 
How far can any system go in allowing the widest possible opportunities for the testing 
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of the validity of laws, administrative decisions and delegated rule-making powers 
without jeopardizing the efficient exercise of executive functions created by genuinely 
democratic institutions? The more concerned any system is with ensuring the 
effectiveness of executive power and the supremacy of enacted legislation, the more 
restrictive will be the conditions imposed upon judicial review of the decision-making 
process or the exercise of delegated legislative powers. At the other end of the 
spectrum is what the average parliamentarian would regard as "the appalling vista" of 
the actio popularis where any citizen or group of citizens can challenge the validity of a 
regulation or an administrative decision, whether or not the particular measure has any 




 has recently pointed to the fact that in 
the Member States, with only rare exceptions, laws cannot be 
challenged by private parties. In some, including, I understand, 
Germany, the same is true of regulations. From this, he suggests 
that it is not essential to a State based on the rule of law 
that individuals be permitted to challenge measures of abstract 
character and general application. In the European Community 
especially, such a right would have serious consequences for 
sound administration because regulations are very often the 
result of difficult compromises on majority or qualified votes 
and private litigants will frequently have ulterior motives for 
attacking legislation. 
 
The need for a balanced solution to this social and 
constitutional problem becomes more acute as society itself 
becomes more complex and bureaucratic. We depend increasingly on 
public authorities and agencies to intervene in almost every 
aspect of social and economic life to provide all manner of 
services. Their decisions often require a technical expertise 
few of us understand. The functions we delegate to them often 
require the exercise of powers which have the potential for far-
reaching effects on private individuals. The greater the 
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opportunities for oppressive intervention in the affairs of 
individuals, the more important it is for society to have an 
acceptable system for policing the lawful use of these powers. 
It is precisely because the former "common market" of the Rome 
Treaty is successfully moving to the "ever closer union" so as 
to become a social and political entity in its own right that 
these constitutional issues assume greater significance and why 
for lawyers they are a subject of constant interest. The degree 
to which the solution at any time leans towards the restrictive 
approach or the liberal one is also, I think, a measure of the 
self confidence of the system and of the constitutional maturity 
of the society the system serves. 
 
The jurisprudence of the European Court very clearly recognizes 
the extent to which the Community finds itself bound up in this 
important social question. Indeed, Community jurisprudence has 
boasted from the very outset the adoption of a progressive and 
liberal approach to the problem. In the Plaumann2 decision of 
1963 in which the Court of Justice first addressed the question 
as to how the concept of "direct and individual concern" was to 
be interpreted, it very confidently asserted that the broadest 
possible construction was to be adopted. Twenty-three years 
later in the 1986 decision of the Court of Justice in Les 
Verts3, you will find a very emphatic assertion made as to the 
central role of judicial review in the Community legal system as 
a comprehensive protection, by law, of the rights of the 
individual citizen of the Community in the face of the complex 
legislative and judicial structure which the Treaty had laid 
down. Given the very clear statement of the judicial function in 
the Community legal system which it contains, paragraph 23 of 
the judgment is worth quoting in full: 
 
 "The European Economic Community is a community based on 
the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor 
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its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether 
the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the 
basic constitutional charter, the Treaty. In particular, in 
Articles 173 and 184, on the one hand, and in Article 177, 
on the other, the Treaty established a complete system of 
legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court 
of Justice to review the legality of measures adopted by 
the institutions. Natural and legal persons are thus 
protected against the application to them of general 
measures which they cannot contest directly before the 
Court by reason of the special conditions of admissibility 
laid down in the second paragraph of Article 173 of the 
Treaty. Where the Community institutions are responsible 
for the administrative implementation of such measures, 
natural or legal persons may bring a direct action before 
the Court against the implementing measures which are 
addressed to them or which are of direct and individual 
concern to them and, in support of such an action, plead 
the illegality of the general measure on which they are 
based. Where implementation is a matter for the national 
authorities, such persons may plead the invalidity of 
general measures before the national courts and can cause 
the latter to request the Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling." 
 
Membership of the Union involves radical transfer of regulatory 
competence to the organs of the Community from the Member 
States. What the European Court is saying in this judgment is 
that the far-reaching effects of this hand-over of power to the 
institutions is balanced by the guarantee that the legal order 
of the Treaty will protect the individual against the excessive 
and oppressive exercise of that power in a manner which is 
incompatible with the explicit provisions of the Treaty or, 
moreover, incompatible with superior rules of law and of 
fundamental human rights which the European Court will imply 
into the legal order of the Community for the purpose. 
 - 1 - 
 
 
The protection of the Community citizen against unlawful 
decisions and invalid regulations is thus available in the forms 
of direct actions for annulment under Article 173 or in a 
challenge before a national court to any attempt to enforce the 
measure at national level. 
 
The Common Law Evolution 
 
My own experience, of course, apart from my involvement in 
Community law since 1973 has been almost exclusively in the 
common law jurisdictions. But having been a barrister since the 
mid-1960s, it is impossible to be unaware of the huge change 
that has taken place in the judicial approach to these problems 
during the last thirty years. In one of the most important of 
the judicial review cases in England during this period (R v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of 
Self Employed and Small Businesses)4, one of the leading English 
judges of modern times, Lord Diplock, described the change in 
approach towards the criteria of locus standi that occurred with 
the reforms of the judicial review procedure in England in 1978 
as being a change in legal policy which represented a "progress 
towards a comprehensive system of administrative law that 
I regard as having been the greatest achievement of the English 
courts in my judicial lifetime". While it is undoubtedly true 
that the approach of the English courts in that and in other 
cases had a major influence on thinking of the judges in all of 
the other common law countries during the period, it is 
nevertheless true, I think, that similar changes were also 
underway in Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and were, 
for a variety of different reasons, frequently dictated by their 
own domestic constitutional circumstances. 
 
The essential question at the heart of the matter is 
straightforward: in order to allow an individual to challenge 
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any given administrative decision or the exercise of any rule-
making power on the part of the executive, what degree of 
interest, if any, must be the applicant be able to demonstrate 
by reference to the decision under attack? In the common law 
world, the starting point is well illustrated by a statement of 
Lord Chelmsford, Lord Chancellor, in the case of Ware v Regent's 
Canal Company5: 
 
     "Where there has been an excess of powers given by an Act 
of Parliament, but no injury has been occasioned to any 
individual, or is imminent and of irreparable consequences, I 
apprehend that no-one but the Attorney General on behalf of the 
public has a right to apply to this Court to check the 
exorbitance of the party in the exercise of the powers confided 
to him by the legislature." 
 
In other words, under the common law system an applicant for 
judicial review against an administrative decision or the 
exercise of a rule-making power had to establish that he himself 
had suffered or was shortly and inevitably going to suffer some 
direct injury or damage before he would be recognized as having 
the necessary interest to bring the application. 
 
Although there had been a huge expansion in the volume of 
litigation in the administrative law area during the following 
one hundred years, the position of English law in, say, the 
1960s when I was studying at university and then commencing 
practice, was extremely difficult and confused. The question of 
standing was bound up with the nature of the remedy sought. This 
in turn was confused by debates as to the significance of the 
difference between private law and public law and the assertion 
of private and public rights. The remedies of declaration and 
injunction were regarded as remedies of private law and could be 
sought only by litigants who could show that their private 
rights were at stake. The prerogative remedies of certiorari, 
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mandamus and prohibition, on the other hand, were public in 
character. As Lord Devlin put it in a case in the early 1950s, 
"orders of certiorari and prohibition are concerned principally 
with public order, it being the duty of the High Court to see 
that inferior courts confine themselves to their own limited 
sphere"6. In another case it had been said that the question of 
granting these orders "is not whether the individual suitor has 
or has not suffered damage, but is whether the royal prerogative 
has been encroached upon by reason of the prescribed order of 
administration of justice having been disobeyed". In the common 
law system, the Attorney General is regarded as the guardian of 
the public interest. Accordingly, if an applicant had no 
personal right at stake, he could only succeed if he could 
obtain the consent of the Attorney General in what was called a 
"relator action". In a famous case in 1978 (Gouriet v Union of 
Post Office Workers)7, where a member of the public tried to 
obtain a declaration that the calling of a strike by post office 
workers would be a breach of the law, the House of Lords 
reaffirmed the fundamental principle of English law that private 
rights can be asserted by individuals but that public rights 
could only be asserted by the Attorney General as representative 
of the public. In theory, the position in relation to 
prerogative remedies of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition was 
that, being public in character, any member of the public was 
entitled to apply for relief but that the court had a discretion 
as to whether it would grant it. The discretion was exercised 
differently depending upon whether the applicant claimed to be 
personally affected or not. If the applicant could show that the 
unlawful decision or unlawful exercise of power caused him 
direct injury, then he was regarded as entitled to apply as of 
right. On the other hand, if he was merely seeking to challenge 
some illegal activity in the public interest, the court would 
exercise its discretion depending upon whether or not it 
considered the matter a sufficiently serious affront to the 
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By the mid-1970s, in some other common law countries and 
particularly those with provisions in a written constitution 
overriding effect of statutory provisions, there had been signs 
of a relaxation in the traditional strict approach to 
requirements of standing. For example, in a decision8 of the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1974 which in some ways reflects the 
distinctions made in Article 173 of the Treaty, it was held that 
the principle requiring personal standing applied to legislation 
of a regulatory character which affects particular persons or 
classes; but that where no-one or no group was affected more 
than any other and there was a justiciable issue, the court was 
entitled to grant declaratory relief to any citizen at its 
discretion. In that case, a tax-payer was held entitled to 
challenge the constitutional validity of the Official Languages 
Act in Canada. As the Court said, it was not the alleged waste 
of public funds alone that gave the applicants standing but the 
right of citizens to insist upon the constitutional behaviour of 
parliament where the issue in such behaviour is justiciable as a 
legal question. 
 
In other words, while the Canadian court was moving away from an 
apparent preoccupation with specific rules attached to 
particular remedies and opening up opportunities for individuals 
to challenge measures where no immediate personal interest was 
at stake. The development produces a situation in which the 
approach of the courts is flexible and pragmatic and the courts 
retain a form of discretion to insist upon qualities of personal 
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In my own country, Ireland, the development has been very 
similar. In an important case of Cahill v Sutton9, the Supreme 
Court refused to allow a litigant to challenge the 
constitutional validity of a particular provision in the statute 
of limitations. The provision in question laid down a three-year 
limitation period for a particular type of action and the 
plaintiff sought to suggest that it was unconstitutional because 
it failed to allow for a situation in which a plaintiff might be 
unaware that the damage had occurred until after the three years 
had expired. That was not her own situation as she had always 
known of the existence of the damage but she was seeking to have 
the provision struck down in order to go ahead with an action 
commenced after the three-year period. The Supreme Court refused 
to permit a constitutional claim to be brought on the basis of a 
hypothetical situation. The Court held that permitting 
unrestricted liberty to challenge statutes would lead to abuse 
and, as Chief Justice O'Higgins (later a judge at the European 
Court) said, it would lead to the Court's becoming "the happy 
hunting ground of the busybody and the crank". 
 
But in subsequent cases, the Irish Supreme Court, like the 
Canadian Supreme Court, has distinguished between cases 
involving purely hypothetical arguments, on the one hand, and 
cases involving challenges to laws which affect all members of 
the public generally. In Ireland, the classic example of the 
latter is the case of Crotty v An Taoiseach10 where a university 
professor sought to challenge the constitutionality of Ireland 
ratifying the Single European Act in 1986. Interestingly, the 
initial application was made on Christmas Eve to a High Court 
judge for an injunction restraining the Government depositing 
its instrument of ratification on the last day of the year, so 
that the full constitutional challenge could be heard. The 
temporary injunction was granted with the result that the 
implementation of the Single European Act in all of the Member 
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States was delayed for several months. Ironically, that 
temporary injunction was granted by Judge Barrington who was 
then a High Court judge and who was, once the Court of First 
Instance was finally established, my predecessor as the Irish 
judge in that Court. 
 
Mr Crotty did not, however, seek to establish that he was 
personally affected in any particular way by the adoption of the 
Single European Act. Notwithstanding the approach that had been 
taken in Cahill v Sutton, however, the Supreme Court held that 
in the particular circumstances where the impugned legislation 
would affect every citizen once it became operative, the 
plaintiff had the locus standi to challenge the Act, 
notwithstanding his failure to prove the threat of any special 
injury or prejudice to himself.  
 
The Present UK Position 
 
In the United Kingdom, the judicial review process was reformed 
in a major way in 1977 when the prerogative remedies and the 
remedies of declaration and injunction were all made available 
in a single form of procedure known as "judicial review". An 
initial application is made to the court ex parte for leave to 
seek judicial review and a common test of locus standi is laid 
down in the stipulation that the court is not to grant leave 
unless it considers that the applicant has shown "a sufficient 
interest in the matter to which the application relates". A 
similar reform was introduced in Ireland in 1980. 
 
At least in the United Kingdom, one of the results of this 
reform has been to achieve a situation of maximum flexibility 
and pragmatism in which an actio popularis is effectively 
permissible but subject to the exercise of the courts' 
discretion in "appropriate cases". This was the result of the 
decision of the House of Lords mentioned a few moments ago - the 
case of R v Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte National 
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Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses in which a 
trade association sought to challenge an agreement made by the 
Revenue Commissioners to abandon the collection of substantial 
arrears of income tax which were owed by workers in the 
newspaper industry in London. The workers had for years 
defrauded the Revenue by working under false names and being 
paid in cash by the newspapers without the deduction of tax. The 
Revenue Commissioners had come to an agreement with the workers 
to waive the arrears of tax if the workers agreed to regularize 
their position by registering as tax-payers and paying tax in 
the future. The Federation claimed that the Revenue 
Commissioners were failing to enforce the law. The lower court 
had held that question of locus standi was a preliminary issue 
and that the applicants had failed to show a sufficient 
interest. The House of Lords reversed this decision but, in 
effect, held that locus standi was not a separate and 
preliminary issue but was bound up with the inherent merits of 
the case. In England, therefore, the question of locus standi in 
judicial review is now a two-stage process. When the initial 
application is made, the test of "sufficient interest" is merely 
a filter to eliminate hopeless and mischievous cases. But on the 
full hearing of the case, the court is required to examine all 
of the issues of law and fact in order to establish if a 
sufficiently serious illegality has been demonstrated. One of 
the results of the decision, therefore, is that once an 
applicant shows that an administrative body is acting 
unlawfully, he will be regarded as having the necessary 
"sufficient interest" in order to maintain the application, 
however remote his actual personal circumstances may be from the 
impact of the illegality. In other words, English law now 
permits the court to entertain a form of actio popularis if, in 
its discretion, the court considers the issue sufficiently 
serious from the point of view of public policy. 
 
In a case somewhat similar to the Irish case on the Single 
European Act (Crotty above), the former editor of The Times 
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newspaper sought a declaration that it was unlawful for the UK 
to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. There was no challenge to his 
locus standi. The Court of Appeal said, "we accept without 
question that Lord Rees-Mogg brings the proceedings because of 
his sincere concern for constitutional issues". 
 
It is difficult to think of a more liberal, flexible and 
pragmatic test for locus standi in these matters than "a sincere 




Although, as you can imagine, I have no expertise whatsoever in 
French law, I have the impression from my own amateur interest 
in it that the evolution of administrative law in France has 
produced a somewhat similar situation in so far as the issue of 
locus standi is concerned. The basic rule before the French 
administrative courts has always been that an applicant must 
show some personal interest in the decision which is the subject 
of the proceeding. It is expressed in the maxim pas d'intérêt, 
pas d'action. The applicant must be able to show that the 
decision he is attacking is one which affects his interest; a 
decision faisant grief. 
 
But it seems clear that the Conseil d'État and the 
Administrative Tribunals have adopted a very flexible and 
pragmatic approach to the character of the sufficient interest 
to be required from one case to another. Although the policy of 
the law in France, as in other countries, has been to resist 
permitting the actio popularis to become available on the 
grounds that it would lead to abuse and open flood-gates of 
litigation which would jeopardize efficient public 
administration, there appear to have been numerous instances in 
decisions of the Conseil d'État during the last thirty or forty 
years in which something very close to an actio popularis has 
been entertained. This seems to be particularly so where 
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associations of various kinds have been permitted to litigate in 
their "collective interest". In 1990, for example, an 
organization called ”Association pour l'objection de conscience 
à toute participation à l'avortement" brought an action before 
the Conseil d'État challenging a decision of the Minister for 
Health to authorize a "morning after" abortion pill upon the 
ground that it violated the European Convention on Human Rights. 





When one turns then to Community law and to the development of 
the jurisprudence of paragraph 4 of Article 173, it is perhaps 
not surprising that much of the literature which has been 
generated echoes the familiar criticisms that have been heard 
elsewhere. It has been said that the approach of the Court has 
been unduly restrictive and has unnecessarily excluded annulment 
actions brought by private parties which could readily have been 
entertained. It is claimed that the Court has been unduly 
lenient in protecting administrative decisions of the 
institutions against judicial scrutiny, especially in the area 
of the agricultural sector, by allowing an exceptionally wide 
margin of administrative discretion on technical and economic 
issues. Critics say that the jurisprudence of the Court is 
inconsistent and unpredictable in that uniform principles tend 
to be applied in different areas with different results. Thus, 
requirements of personal interest are far more stringent for an 
attempt to challenge measures in the area of the agricultural 
policy compared with challenges brought against, say, anti-
dumping regulations. I suspect, however, that while these 
features of the jurisprudence can well be characterized as 
matters for criticism from the point of view of the purist 
seeking legal clarity and the firm application of a well-defined 
principle, the better view is that the jurisprudence reflects 
merely the same tensions and conflicts that have been 
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experienced in the development of administrative law elsewhere. 
 
Article 173 ECT 
 
Article 173 does a number of things. It confers judicial review 
competence upon the Court of Justice: it lays down the grounds 
upon which acts of the institutions may be annulled; and it 
confers automatic locus standi upon the Member States and the 
institutions for this purpose. Paragraph 4 then provides: 
 
 "Any natural or legal person may, under the same 
conditions, institute proceedings against a decision 
addressed to that person or against a decision which, 
although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual 
concern to the former." 
 
In so far as admissibility of applications is concerned, this 
provision provides no difficulty where a decision is under 
attack and the decision had been addressed to the individual 
seeking to challenge it. Nor has the concept of "direct" concern 
posed any real difficulty. The word is used as indicating an 
absence of any intermediate agency such as a national 
implementing measure giving effect to the act. The problems 
which the interpretation of the provision have thrown up can be 
summarized, I think, in the following questions: 
 
 (1)How is the concept of "individual concern" to be defined 
and does it mean the same thing in all circumstances? 
 
 (2)In so far as admissibility is concerned, what function 
is performed by the distinction between a regulation and a 
decision in the form of a regulation? and 
 
 (3)What function, if any, is performed in the application 
of the paragraph by the fact that a possible alternative 
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remedy may be available to the applicant by means of a 
remedy before a national court invoking Article 184 and 
utilizing the mechanism of Article 177? 
 
The Alternative Remedy 
 
Looking at these questions in reverse order, I think it is fair 
to say that there has been a good deal of ambiguity as to the 
precise significance of the third factor. Clearly, there is 
nothing in either Article 173 or 184 which would suggest that a 
challenge to a regulation under the former should be treated as 
inadmissible upon the ground only that it could equally be 
brought through the medium of Article 184. If the application is 
lodged within the two-month period and the applicant has locus 
standi, the Court cannot refuse to entertain the application. 
The rationale of Article 184 is, no doubt, to ensure that in a 
Community based upon the rule of law, invalid legislation does 
not come to be enforced at national level by reason only of the 
fact that nobody with a sufficient interest to do so has 
challenged its validity within the time available under Article 
173. Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that a party with 
a clear entitlement to take a direct action under Article 173 
who fails to do so within the time-limit cannot then seek to 
circumvent the limitation period by devising an action at 
national level for the express purpose of having it set aside 
under Article 184 (Case C-188/92 TWD Textilwerke1). It also 
seems reasonably clear that the availability of an alternative 
remedy under Article 184 could not in itself have any bearing 
upon the concept of "direct and individual concern". And yet, 
there is a striking preoccupation with the need to address the 
issue in very many of the cases. For example, in two judgments 
delivered on 22 October last, the Court of First Instance 
considered two parallel challenges brought against decisions 
allegedly taken by the Commission in the state aid context. The 
Commission had previously approved a proposal by the Netherlands 
Government for a general regional aid scheme as compatible with 
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the Common Market under Article 92(3). A year later, the Dutch 
Government proposed to grant a particular subsidy for the 
building of a new salt plant to a company called Frima. A 
British competitor of Frima, Salt Union Ltd, and the French 
trade association for that industry both complained to the 
Commission and called upon it to take measures to prevent the 
subsidy. The Commission sent letters in reply, pointing out that 
the general scheme had been approved the previous year so that 
the specific application of its provisions in favour of Frima 
did not need any separate approval from the Commission. The two 
actions11 were then brought, challenging those letters as a 
decision refusing to take appropriate measures under Article 93. 
The applications were declared inadmissible upon the ground that 
there was no "decision" with binding legal effect contained in 
the letters which were merely replies on the part of the 
Commission explaining the situation. One of the arguments made 
by the applicants was that if the applications were declared 
inadmissible, the judicature would be deprived of any 
opportunity of reviewing the legality of an aid of the kind in 
question. They pointed out that there was no domestic legal 
remedy because only Article 93(3) of the Treaty requiring 
notification of a proposed aid was of direct effect, while the 
Commission was claiming that payment of an individual aid 
approved under a general scheme needed no notification. In each 
case, the Court went out of its way to point out in the 
concluding paragraph of each judgment that these arguments were 
incorrect. It was open to the applicants to challenge the 
decision of the national authorities to grant the state aid in 
question before the national courts and, if the aid was part of 
a general scheme, to challenge the validity of the Commission's 
approval and to seek, if appropriate, to bring the issue before 
the European Court through the mechanism of Article 177.  
 
In a decision of 5 June this year, the Court of First Instance 
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made the opposite point that the clear absence of any remedy in 
respect of the decision before the national courts could not 
operate of itself so as to create a locus standi for the 
applicant under Article 173. In that case (Kahn Scheepvaart12), a 
Netherlands company sought to challenge a decision of the 
Commission approving a German state aids scheme for the 
shipbuilding industry taken in accordance with the provisions of 
the Seventh Council Directive on Aids to Shipbuilding. The 
applicants sought to argue that the aids proposed by the German 
Government, when taken in conjunction with the effect of the tax 
allowances available under German income tax law, exceeded what 
was permissible under the terms of the directive. The Commission 
sought to argue that the applicants should have attacked the 
German decision to grant the aid before the German courts. The 
applicants argued very forcibly that it was unrealistic to 
suggest that a Dutch company which had no standing as a tax-
payer in Germany could have the necessary status under German 
law to take such a proceeding. Having held that the applicant 
was not in any event "individually concerned" by the Commission 
decision, the Court pointed out that "even the possible absence 
of a remedy under German national law, as the applicant claims, 
cannot constitute a ground for the Court to exceed the limits of 
its jurisdiction as set forth by the fourth paragraph of Article 
173". 
 
There are, therefore, two clearly established propositions. On 
the one hand, the complete absence of a remedy for the applicant 
at national level cannot operate so as to create the conditions 
of admissibility under Article 173 where they do not otherwise 
exist. On the other hand, the possible availability of an 
alternative remedy at national level will not render the direct 
action inadmissible if the criteria of paragraph 4 are 
satisfied. 
 
Nevertheless, while the availability of the alternative remedy 
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is not an ingredient of the test of admissibility under Article 
173(4), it seems reasonably clear that it is a factor which has 
some influence upon the approach of the Court in these cases, 
given the frequency with which the Court finds it necessary to 
answer the arguments whenever they are raised and even though 
the answer does not form part of the admissibility decision in 
the case. This is, I believe, an indication of the practical 
considerations which influence the policy of the Court in the 
evolving jurisprudence of Article 173. 
 
The real obstacles, however, in the way of an evolution of the 
jurisprudence towards a more generous and flexible approach to 
the locus standi of individuals were the requirements of 
"individual concern" and the apparent stipulation that if the 
attacked measure was in the form of a regulation it had to be 
shown to be in substance a decision. 
 
Until relatively recently, and notwithstanding the promise of 
"the broadest interpretation" in the Plaumann case, the twofold 
implication of the jurisprudence appeared to be that, first, 
paragraph 4 had to be given a very literal interpretation on 
these points and, secondly, the requirements were regarded as 
being separate and cumulative. On the face of it, the literal 
construction is difficult to avoid. Under paragraph 1, the 
jurisdiction of the Court is a jurisdiction to "review the 
legality of acts" in very general terms and only recommendations 
and opinions are excepted. Paragraph 4, on the other hand, is 
very explicitly confined to proceedings brought against a 
decision. A natural or legal person may bring a proceeding 
against three particular types of decision: a decision addressed 
to himself; a decision addressed to another person, provided 
that decision is of direct and individual concern to the 
applicant; and a decision which, although it is apparently in 
the form of a regulation, is of direct and individual concern to 
the applicant. In other words, in relation to this third 
category, the jurisdiction of the Court depended upon the 
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applicant demonstrating that what was apparently a regulation in 
form was in substance a decision and, moreover, a decision of 
direct and individual concern to him. 
 
In the Plaumann decision in 1963, the Court had defined the 
distinction between a regulation and a decision by reference to 
Article 189 of the Treaty. Regulations were legislative in 
character and intended to apply to persons generally or to 
categories of persons viewed in the abstract. Decisions are by 
definition more focused and apply to a limited number of persons 
who are, in effect, addressed by the decision. 
 
The "Closed Category" Cases 
 
Not surprisingly, this distinction has proved extremely 
difficult to apply in particular cases, especially, for example, 
in the agricultural sector where a form of regulation is 
frequently used for a measure which will in practice regulate 
only the affairs of a very small number of traders in particular 
products; who may already be known to the institution and who 
will have had a hand in the deliberations which led to its 
formulation. In the Calpak13 cases, for example, a number of 
producers of Williams pears sought to annul a regulation made by 
the Commission which had the effect of limiting the amount of 
aid granted to processors to 105 percent of the quantity that 
had been produced during a particular marketing year. 
Previously, the aid had been calculated on average production 
over three years. The number of processors involved was very 
small (38) and they were readily identifiable and even known to 
the Commission. The case is an example of one of many attempts 
to invoke the so-called "closed category" argument according to 
which a legislative measure directed at a specific group of 
identified persons is properly regarded as a series of 
individual decisions applicable to their particular cases. In 
the Calpak case, the argument was rejected by the Court which 
                         
13
 Joined Cases 789/79 and 790/79 Calpak v Commission [1980] ECR 1949. 
 - 1 - 
 
said that a provision limiting the grant of aid for all 
producers of a particular product is by nature a measure of 
general application. It said, "the measure applies to 
objectively determined situations and produces legal effects 
with regard to categories of person described in a generalized 
and abstract manner. The nature of a measure as a regulation is 
not called into question by the mere fact that it is possible to 
identify the number or even the identity of the producers to be 
granted the aid". Another recent application of this approach 
can be found in the judgment of the CFI of 7 November last in 
Roquette Frères SA v Council14. 
 
By way of contrast, the Weddel15 case in 1990 is an example of a 
series of cases where the argument succeeded. There, the 
regulation under attack directed how import licences for the 
allocation of an import tariff quota under the GATT arrangements 
were to be dealt with by the national authorities. Under those 
arrangements, a fixed quantity of beef or veal could be imported 
into the Community each year and licences were issued to 
Community importers for the purpose. Applications had to be 
lodged by traders with the national agencies, and once the total 
demand for licences was known, the applications were scaled back 
proportionately to enable the available quantity to be 
allocated. In the case in question, a further adjustment 
reducing the percentage quantities allocated to the traders 
became necessary and this was done by the contested regulation. 
The Commission defended the case on the basis that this was a 
true legislative measure and the fact that it was possible to 
determine the number and even the identity of the traders 
enacted by the regulation did not make it a "disguised decision" 
which could be reviewed. According to the Court, the factor 
which distinguished this situation from that of Calpak was that 
the category of applicants for licences became fixed once the 
closing date for applications was reached and no new traders 
                         
14
 Case T-298/94 Roquette Frères SA v Council, not yet reported. 
15
 Case C-354/87 Weddel v Commission [1990] ECR I-3847. 
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could join the closed group. Because the regulation effectively 
determined the quantities to be allocated to each member of that 
closed group, it was properly categorized as a series of 
decisions on those applications. The regulation was not of 
general application. As the Court put it, the measure "must be 
regarded as a bundle of individual decisions taken in the guise 
of a regulation, each of those decisions affecting the legal 
position of each applicant". 
 
Part of the difficulty in identifying the essential ingredients 
of locus standi is the fact that there appears to be a degree of 
confusion or, at least, overlap of the concepts of individual 
concern, on the one hand, and the so-called "disguised 
decision", on the other. The classic definition of "individual 
concern" was given the Court of Justice in the Plaumann case and 
the particular formula has been repeated over and over again in 
all relevant cases ever since. The actual wording used in the 
English text of the judgment as published is as follows: 
 
 "Persons other than those to whom a decision is addressed 
may only claim to be individually concerned if that 
decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which 
are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances by which 
they are differentiated from all other persons and by 
virtue of these factors distinguishes them individually 
just as in the case of the person addressed." 
 
In passing, I would like to point out that this is one of those 
unfortunate passages of Community jurisprudence which have 
acquired an almost legendary status through constant repetition 
but which, at least in the English text, are somewhat obscure. 
One of the reasons for this, of course, is that the Plaumann 
case dates from 1963 so that the text of the judgment was not 
originally rendered in English but was one of many translated 
into English very hurriedly in 1973 when the two English 
speaking countries joined the Common Market. Apart from its 
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grammatical deficiencies, the English text does not closely 
reflect the French text and, indeed, seems to depart 
significantly from the wording used in the Treaty itself. 
Perhaps a more helpful paraphrase of the passage would be as 
follows: 
 
 "It is settled case-law that persons other than those to 
whom a decision is addressed cannot claim that the decision 
is of individual concern to them unless it affects them by 
reason of specific attributes peculiar to themselves or of 
factual circumstances which distinguish them from all other 
persons; so that the presence of these factors singles them 
out as if they were the person addressed." 
 
It is very difficult, therefore, to identify any major 
difference between the test for individual concern and the test 
for distinguishing a regulation from a decision. The test for 
individual concern is whether or not the measure impacts upon an 
applicant because of circumstances peculiar to him which 
differentiate him from everyone else. The test for 
distinguishing a regulation from a decision, as identified in 
the Plaumann case as well, is that "one must inquire whether the 
measure concerns specific persons" as opposed to being of 
general application. But if a measure (whether in the form of a 
decision or in the form of a regulation) must be treated as a 
decision because it is a measure which concerns specific 
persons, it necessarily follows that the measure is also of 
individual concern to any one of those specific persons. Or so 
it seems to me. Perhaps the essential feature which 
distinguishes the true "closed category" situation such as in 
Weddel from the cases such as Calpak or Roquette Frères, where 
the class is limited but not permanently closed, is that when 
you ask precisely what it was the institution was doing when it 
adopted the measure, it is possible in the closed category 
instances to answer that the institution was not genuinely 
enacting a law but was taking a decision as to how a small 
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Another feature of the jurisprudence which suggests that the 
concept of "individual concern" is the dominant ingredient in 
any test of locus standi under paragraph 4 and that the concept 
of the "disguised decision" is something of a red herring, is to 
be found in the series of cases dealing with applications for 
annulment of anti-dumping regulations. Under the series of basic 
regulations laying down the rules for anti-dumping measures 
against imports from non-Member States, the anti-dumping duties 
can only be imposed by measures adopted in the form of 
regulations. Prima facie, therefore, an anti-dumping regulation 
is a genuine normative measure applicable to all of the parties 
with an interest in the trade in question. Nevertheless, the 
procedure leading to the adoption of anti-dumping regulations 
invariably commences with a complaint from aggrieved competitors 
within the Community against cheap imports from enterprises in 
third countries. There follows an investigation by the 
Commission which looks in detail at costs and pricing of the 
products and invariably involves the submission of evidence and 
observations from either the foreign manufacturers or exporters 
or from their importing agents within the Community. Discussions 
and negotiations may well take place between the Commission and 
enterprises concerned. The fact that these have taken place may 
well be mentioned in the recitals to the eventual regulation and 
the enterprises in question may even be identified. The judgment 
of the Court of First Instance on 18 September last in the case 
of Climax Paper Converters Ltd16 is a typical example. The anti-
dumping regulation challenged in that case had its origin in a 
complaint made by the Committee of European Photo Album 
Manufacturers against imports of photo albums manufactured by a 
particular company in China and exported to the Community by a 
related company in Hong Kong. The regulation imposing the anti-
                         
16
 Case T-155/94 Climax Paper Converters Ltd v Council (18 September 1996, not yet reported). 
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dumping duty was formulated in terms of general application and 
imposed the duty on all imports of those products from the 
People's Republic of China. Climax Paper Converters Ltd had 
taken part in the investigation procedure and submitted 
evidence. It took part in meetings with the Commission. Indeed, 
the only evidence available to the Commission which formed the 
basis of the calculation of the duty was evidence submitted in 
relation to the applicant's products. The applicant was named in 
the recitals. 
 
The Council, in defending the claim, objected to the 
admissibility of the application on the basis that the applicant 
could not be directly and individually concerned. The regulation 
was directed at all imports of the products from China and was 
not, therefore, addressed to the applicant alone. As China is a 
state trading country, all exports are effectively regulated by 
the state and issues of cost and pricing are not generally 
within the independent discretion of a trading entity such as 
the applicant. 
 
The Court of First Instance followed the approach which had been 
laid down in earlier cases such as Allied Corporation17 and 
Extramet18 in which it had held that although the anti-dumping 
regulations are by nature and scope of a normative character, 
they can nevertheless be of direct and individual concern to 
those producers and exporters trading in the products in 
question. 
 
Throughout the jurisprudence, the Court has explained the 
rationale of the distinction between a regulation and a decision 
and the justification for the requirement that the regulation be 
a disguised decision as that of ensuring that the institutions 
may not, by mere choice of a form of a measure, deprive 
                         
17
 Joined Cases 239/82 and 275/82 Allied Corporation and others v Commission [1984] ECR 
1005. 
18
 Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie SA v Council [1991] ECR I-2501. 
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individuals of their right to challenge the validity of a 
measure. But in the case of the anti-dumping duties, the 
relevant institution has no such choice. The use of the 
regulation is mandatory. The measure is a regulation in every 
case because that is what the basic regulation requires. 
Nevertheless, the reality of the situation, as recognized by the 
Court in these cases, is that the entire formulation of the 
regulation is based upon detailed consideration of the specific 
circumstances of a small number of identified traders including 
specific traders who may have been in direct consultation with 
the Commission for the purpose. Although the anti-dumping 
regulation remains both in form and substance a legislative or 
normative measure, the Court has nevertheless been prepared to 
reflect the reality of the situation by acknowledging that the 
traders in question are individually concerned and therefore 
have the locus standi to challenge the regulation.  
 
The Extramet Case 
 
The Extramet case is a particularly good illustration of the way 
in which the anti-dumping cases appear to depart from the more 
general principle pursued in other cases. In that case, the 
regulation had imposed a duty on imports of calcium-metal from 
China and the Soviet Union. The applicant, Extramet, was neither 
the exporter nor the producer of the product but one of the 
largest independent importers within the Community. The Council 
objected to admissibility upon the basis that Extramet could not 
be individually concerned because it was an independent importer 
whose selling prices had not been taken into consideration for 
the purposes of the investigation. Nor had Extramet taken part 
in the investigation or been named or identified in the 
regulation itself. The Court acknowledged that the requirements 
for individual concern could be satisfied by producers and by 
exporters who were themselves involved in the investigation or 
identified in the recitals to the regulation, but simply said 
that "such recognition of the right of certain categories of 
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traders to bring an action for annulment cannot prevent other 
traders from also claiming to be individually concerned". The 
fact that the applicant was the largest importer of the product 
into the Community and that "its business depends to a very 
large extent on those imports and are seriously affected by the 
contested regulation" was sufficient to satisfy the Plaumann 
requirement of attributes and circumstances peculiar to the 
applicant. 
 
Unfortunately, this appears to lead to a situation in which the 
jurisprudence propounds two propositions which cannot easily be 
reconciled. First, there is the proposition of the Calpak cases, 
and frequently repeated in others, that a measure does not lose 
its general and abstract legislative character because it may be 
possible to ascertain with a greater or lesser degree of 
accuracy the number or even the identity of the persons to whom 
it will apply at any given time. The anti-dumping cases show, 
however, that a measure must necessarily preserve its character 
as a regulation and still be open to attack by an undertaking 
which has genuine individual concern by reason of the extent of 
its impact upon its business. 
 
In dumping cases, therefore, it seems now reasonably clear that 
it is not a necessary ingredient of locus standi in an action 
for annulment under Article 173 that the applicant must show 
that the dumping regulation is a disguised decision. In effect, 
because of the close similarity between the test as to the 
distinction between a regulation and a disguised decision, on 
the one hand, and to the test of individual concern, on the 
other, the applicant will be entitled to be heard so long as he 
can show the circumstances or attributes of individual concern. 
This can be done either by showing that he has taken part in the 
discussions which led to the formulation of the duty and is 
referred to in the recitals to the regulation; or that his trade 
in the products on which the duty is imposed is such that he is 
exceptionally injured by the effect of the duty.  
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The Codorniu Case 
 
The most recent major step in this evolution of Community 
jurisprudence is the Codorniu19 case which is, in its own way, 
the Community equivalent of the House of Lords' decision in the 
Federation of Small Businesses case. 
 
The Codorniu case was an application for annulment of part of 
Council Regulation No 2045/89 which inserted an amendment in an 
earlier regulation laying down general rules for the description 
of sparkling wines. One of its effects was to reserve the term 
"crémant" as a designation for sparkling wines produced in 
France and Luxembourg only. The applicant was a major producer 
of sparkling wine in Spain and, in fact, the Community's single 
largest producer of sparkling wine described as "crémant". 
Furthermore, since 1924, it had used the registered trade mark 
"Gran crémant de Codorniu" on its products. The Council, as 
defendant, raised an objection as to admissibility on the ground 
that the measure was a true regulation with general application 
to all producers of sparkling wines. In the classic language of 
the case-law it was claimed to be a measure "applicable to an 
objectively determined situation which had legal effects in 
respect of categories of persons considered in a general and 
abstract manner". The applicant, accordingly, was only concerned 
by the provision in the same way as any other producer. Codorniu 
responded by arguing that the regulation did not in reality have 
a general scope but was directed at a well-known and closed 
category of producers of these products which were readily 
identifiable when the legislation was introduced. The applicant 
relied heavily on the Extramet judgment. It is worth, I think, 
quoting the crucial paragraph of the Court's judgment in full: 
 
 "Although it is true that according to the criteria in the 
second paragraph of Article 173 of the Treaty, the 
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 Case C-309/89 Codorniu SA v Council [1994] ECR I-1853. 
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contested provision is, by nature and by virtue of its 
sphere of application, of a legislative nature in that it 
applies to the traders concerned in general, that does not 
prevent it from being of individual concern to some of 
them. Natural or legal persons may claim that a contested 
provision is of individual concern to them only if it 
affects them by reason of certain attributes which are 
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances by which 
they are differentiated from all other persons (Plaumann). 
Codorniu registered the trade mark "Gran crémant de 
Codorniu" in Spain in 1924 and traditionally used that mark 
both before and after registration. By reserving the right 
to use the term "crémant" to French and Luxembourg 
producers, the contested provision prevents Codorniu from 
using its graphic trade mark. It follows that Codorniu has 
established the existence of a situation which, from the 
point of view of the contested provision, differentiates it 
from all others." 
 
What is remarkable about this passage is that for the first time 
and in explicit terms, the Court of Justice has disregarded the 
issue as to whether the applicant had demonstrated that the 
regulation was a disguised decision. On the contrary, the Court 
fully recognizes that the regulation in question was genuinely 
of general application to all traders in sparkling wines. 
Nevertheless, by virtue only of the fact that the applicant was 
a trader who had a particular trade mark for the product 
concerned, he was entitled to claim to be directly and 
individually concerned by the regulation. In other words, the 
regulation operated as such in its application to the world at 
large: but was simultaneously a decision so far as Codorniu 
alone was concerned. It decided his case: it threatened to ruin 
him. While the judgment may in one sense appear to be 
remarkable, it is also possible to regard it as being no more 
than an extension of the approach already taken in the anti-
dumping cases where the legislative character of the regulation 
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as applied to traders in general did not prevent it being 
treated as of individual concern to one or more traders in 
particular. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the Extramet case, Advocate 
General Jacobs had openly invited the Court to abandon the 
ingredient of the "disguised decision" as part of the conditions 
of locus standi when he said: 
 
 "The Court should, in my view, make clear what is already 
implicit in the prevailing trend of its case-law, namely 
that the requirement of a decision does not exist 
independently of the requirement of individual concern." 
 
In the Codorniu case, Advocate General Lenz seemed to be 
suggesting in very similar terms that the jurisprudence of the 
Court in this area was due for a comprehensive review. He said, 
"I am of the opinion that the general classification of the 
contested provision as a measure in the nature of a regulation, 
is not sufficient for the action to be dismissed as 
inadmissible. On the contrary, it must be considered whether the 
applicant is individually concerned by it". 
 
The Conspiracy Theory 
 
The Codorniu judgment was handed down on 18 May 1994 and 
effectively coincided with the transfer of direct actions 
brought by individuals against measures of the institutions to 
the Court of First Instance. It is tempting to consider that 
this relaxation in the conditions of locus standi was a form of 
welcoming gift from the Court of Justice to the Court of First 
Instance on that occasion. What is intriguing about that 
possibility is that in the course of educating myself about 
locus standi under Article 173 since I arrived in Luxembourg, I 
came across an article20 written back in 1980 by the Danish 
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 Hjalte Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 interpreted against private plaintiffs?, European Law 
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professor, Hjalte Rasmussen, in which he put forward a form of 
conspiracy theory about Article 173. In examining the 
jurisprudence to date, he concluded that Article 173(4) was 
construed very restrictively against the interests of individual 
applicants. He suggested that the reason for this was that the 
Court of Justice at the time had a hidden agenda. The objective 
of the Court in the manner in which it construed paragraph 4 
was, he thought, to bring about pressure for the restructuring 
of the judicial function of the Community. According to him, the 
Court saw itself as a final appellate jurisdiction dealing only 
with pure questions of law. Issues of locus standi required a 
more detailed examination of facts and circumstances which would 
be appropriate to an inferior jurisdiction operating as a 
tribunal of first instance. According to Professor Rasmussen, 
the policy of the Court was to enlarge the responsibility of the 
national courts and of any possible tribunal of first instance 
in the area of providing Community citizens with protection for 
individual rights. By unburdening itself of direct actions, 
claims for damages and staff cases, the Court could then become 
a final appellate court dealing exclusively with issues of law 
and the actions brought by and against the Member States for 
failure to comply with Community law. 
 
The intriguing question arises, therefore, if Professor 
Rasmussen's conspiracy theory was correct, as to whether the 
European Court used the Codorniu case in order deliberately to 
relax the conditions for locus standi under Article 173(4) so as 
to equip the Court of First Instance with a far more flexible 
and pragmatic basis for assessing the admissibility of direct 
actions for annulment brought by private persons.  
 
If the overall policy was to place the judicature of the 
Community as a whole in a position to take a more flexible and 
more pragmatic approach to the question of locus standi and, in 
that sense, to bring the Community jurisprudence into line with 
                                                                            
Review 1980, p. 112. 
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developments elsewhere in the world, then it seems fair to say 
that the development has been reflected in the approach of the 
Court of First Instance since 1994. In the case of Antillean 
Rice Mills NV v Commission21 decided in September 1995, for 
example, the CFI added a further dimension to the element of 
individual concern. In the Plaumann test, you will recall, the 
element of individual concern turned upon the special attributes 
or peculiar circumstances of the applicant himself. In Antillean 
Rice Mills, the CFI held that "where the Commission is, by 
virtue of specific provisions, under a duty to take account of 
the consequences of the measure which it envisages adopting for 
the situation of certain individuals, that fact distinguishes 
them individually" for the purposes of the locus standi test. In 
other words, an applicant can be treated as being individually 
concerned if the conditions governing the adoption of the 
contested measure by the institution require, as a matter of 
law, that the applicant's circumstances be taken into 
consideration. Unlike the Codorniu case, the approach of the CFI 
was not to see if the effect of the measure was to deprive the 
applicants of particular pre-existing rights. The element of 
individual concern was satisfied by the fact that the Community 
provisions themselves demanded that regard be had to the 





Similar reasoning was applied by the Court of First Instance to 
related cases in April of last year in the Perrier22 and Vittel23 
cases. These cases had been brought by employee organizations 
seeking the annulment of a Commission decision under the Merger 
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 Case T-96/92 Comité central d'entreprise de la société générale des grandes sources a.o. v 
Commission [1995] ECR II-1213. 
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 Case T-12/93 Comité central d'entreprise de la société anonyme Vittel a.o. v Commission 
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Regulation which authorized a merger between Nestlé and Perrier. 
Although this was a case of a decision properly so-called which 
was addressed to the parties to a particular merger, the CFI 
held that the employees represented by the applicants could be 
treated as individually concerned by the decision because the 
Commission was under a duty pursuant to the Merger Regulation 
"to ascertain whether the concentration is liable to have 
consequences, even if only indirectly, for the position of the 
employees in the undertakings in question, such as to affect the 
levels or conditions of employment in the Community or a 
substantial part of it". 
 
Although these cases might, at first sight, be thought to 
introduce a new element into the concept of locus standi under 
paragraph 4 and to create a new class of exceptions to a general 
rule, I think it is also possible to see them as merely the 
logical extension of an approach that has been adopted in the 
anti-dumping cases, competition cases and state aid cases over a 
considerable period. 
 
As is well known, the Court has taken a far more flexible 
approach to the concept and to the requirements of the paragraph 
in competition cases. For example, twenty years ago in the Metro 
SB-Großmärkte24 case, the Court regarded a complainant in a 
competition procedure under Regulation No 17/62 as satisfying 
the requirement of individual concern for the purpose of 
challenging a Commission decision addressed to another 
enterprise to the effect that no infringement of the competition 
rule had taken place. Metro had itself introduced the complaint 
under Regulation No 17/62 and was one of the undertakings 
excluded from the distribution system operated by the 
respondent. The rationale of the approach in the Metro case is 
that the law recognized the entitlement of Metro to introduce 
the complaint and once the Commission had decided to investigate 
it, Metro had a legitimate interest in the resulting decision. 
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As complainant, it was effectively a party to the proceeding. 
But it is not the fact that the undertaking has been the 
complainant instigating the procedure which determines the 
matter. In the second Metro case in 198625, the investigation did 
not arise out of a complaint by that undertaking, although Metro 
had submitted observations during the course of the procedure. 
Nevertheless, it still had locus standi. 
 
The importance of involvement in the procedure is evident from 
the fact that in many of the cases that have arisen out of state 
aid proceedings, locus standi to challenge a Commission decision 
has been recognized in favour of parties who have submitted 
observations or been consulted as "persons concerned". Although 
undertakings do not have the same formally recognized status 
accorded to them under the competition rules and Regulation No 
17/62, the Court has recognized that where undertakings can 
complain or where they have been listened to as part of the 
investigation procedure under Article 93, they have a legitimate 
interest in the outcome of the procedure which is sufficient to 
give them locus standi to challenge the decision under paragraph 
4.  
 
But the application of this approach by analogy is not confined 
to circumstances where it is a provision of the Treaty or of 
internal legislation of the Community which recognizes the 
entitlement of the third party to be concerned in a procedure 
which leads to the making of the challenged decision. The 
Antillean Rice Mills case, for example, is based directly upon 
the approach which had been previously taken in the Piraiki-
Patraiki case26 which arose out of Article 130 of the Act of 
Accession of Greece to the Community. The provision in question 
entitled the Commission to take certain protective measures but, 
before so deciding, was obliged "in so far as the circumstances 
of the case permit, to inquire into the negative effects which 
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its decision might have on the economy (of the Member State 
concerned) as well as on the undertakings concerned". The 
applicants in the Piraiki-Patraiki case were recognized as 
having the necessary qualifications of locus standi because they 
were amongst "the undertakings concerned". Although there was no 
explicit right and no defined procedure for consultation of any 
identifiable undertakings or associations of undertakings, the 
mere fact that the legislation recognized an obligation on the 
part of the Commission to take their position into account was 




In the thirty years or so since the Plaumann decision, 
therefore, it is possible to say, I think, that the 
jurisprudence of the European Court has moved, however 
gradually, a very considerable distance away from the apparently 
restrictive view which the earlier cases adopted. In the first 
place, the dual test of individual concern and the need to show 
that a regulation is a disguised decision has been considerably 
relaxed so that it is the element of individual concern which is 
now the dominant criterion. Secondly, in a relatively wide range 
of specific cases where the legislative regime itself recognizes 
the entitlement of private parties to involve themselves in the 
legislative or decision-making process, either as direct parties 
such as complainants in competition matters or as merely 
interested or concerned parties entitled to be heard, they will 
be recognized as having the necessary interest to challenge the 
resulting decision. Furthermore, even where there is no defined 
role for the third party in the procedure, if the legislative 
context is such as to require the institution to take the 
interests of those parties into account prior to making the 
decision, it is highly probable that the parties involved will 
be entitled to be heard by the Court under Article 173(4).  
 
I recognize, of course, that this apparent evolution towards a 
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more liberal approach to admissibility under paragraph 4 does 
not meet with universal approval. From the point of view of the 
practising lawyers, the situation appears to be one of 
considerable uncertainty and they often find it extremely 
difficult to advise clients as to whether the particular 
circumstances of their case will successfully meet the criteria 
of admissibility. Very often, the criticism made is that the 
exceptional cases such as Codorniu, Extramet and Piraiki-
Patraiki are the result of very special circumstances which are 
not capable of giving rise to a principle of general 
application.  
 
As I have mentioned, some commentators, particularly those with 
the security of the legislative process at heart, fear that an 
opening up of the criteria of admissibility under Article 173 
could have disastrous consequences for efficient public 
administration. Especially at Community level, many regulations 
and decisions are the result of compromise choices worked out 
with great difficulty either between the interests of Member 
States or the opposing interests of operators in the sector to 
which the legislation will apply. If private parties with their 
own ulterior motives for challenging the legislation have easy 
access to an action for annulment under Article 173, it is 
feared that the legislative process itself could be greatly 
damaged.  
 
While it may well be true that there are special considerations 
that ought properly to be taken into account at this stage of 
the development of the European Community, it still seems to me 
that these fears about the opening up of flood-gates under 
Article 173 are misguided. After all, what we are discussing 
here is merely the criteria for admissibility of these claims 
under paragraph 4. Even when the claim is admissible, it cannot 
succeed unless the applicant can establish one of the grounds of 
invalidity laid down by the first paragraph. A decision on 
admissibility is no more than a decision that the Court will 
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listen to the claim which the applicant makes.  
 
If the boast which the Community makes in the passage I quoted 
earlier from the decision in the Les Verts case is correct and 
worthwhile, then it is illogical to criticize any evolution of 
the jurisprudence which relaxes the criteria of paragraph 4. The 
essential message of that case is that the European Community is 
a community founded squarely on the rule of law. The purpose of 
the comprehensive system of judicial review provided for by the 
joint mechanism of Article 173 taken with Articles 184 and 177 
is that it is repugnant to any constitution based upon the rule 
of law that any citizen should be subjected to unconstitutional 
legislation or unlawful decisions. If the law is invalid or the 
decision is illegal, then it ought to be set aside one way or 
another, and it is only of procedural significance whether that 
result is achieved through the mechanism of Article 173 or the 
mechanism of Article 184. If we are agreed as a matter of 
constitutional principle that invalid legislation and unlawful 
decisions should not be beyond challenge in a Community based 
upon the rule of law, then the question as to whether third 
parties should have locus standi under Article 173(4) should be 
determined by practical and procedural considerations and not 
treated as a question of immutable principle.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, it is my view that the developments 
that have taken place in some of the case-law I have referred to 
bring the Community very close to the situation which has been 
achieved in many of the national jurisdictions. By this I mean 
that the criteria of admissibility as they are now understood in 
the case-law are sufficiently flexible to enable the European 
Courts to entertain serious challenges when brought by third 
parties who have a genuine interest in the outcome of the issue 
which is raised, while at the same time being sufficiently 
pragmatic to enable the Court in appropriate cases to decline 
jurisdiction if the applicant's interest is too remote or too 
mischievous or if the subject-matter of the challenge is more 
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clearly suited to the detailed investigation and assessment that 
can be conducted in a national court. 
 
1..
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